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STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL 
Bernard Bo Bollinger* 
Daniel Bussel** 
The Honorable James E. Massey*** 
MR. ZISHOLTZ: Welcome back. We’re going to go ahead and get started 
again with our second panel. We have our exclusive Stern v. Marshall panel, 
and I’m sure we’re going to learn a lot from our panel here today. I’d like to 
introduce our moderator, Mr. Bo Bollinger. Bo is a shareholder at Buchalter 
Nemer and is joining us all the way from Los Angeles, California. Bo is Chair 
of Buchalter Nemer’s Insolvency and Financial Solutions Practice Group and a 
member of the firm’s Board of Directors. He is also Co-Chair of the firm’s 
Continuing Legal Education Committee. Bo regularly represents creditors and 
acquirers in real estate-related bankruptcy cases, including multiple 
engagements for one of the largest real estate development companies in 
southern California. Bo earned his J.D. at Loyola Law School and received his 
B.A. from the University of Southern California. Thank you, Bo, for joining 
us, and we’re excited for this panel. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Thank you, Jeremy. Good morning, everybody. Let me 
take a second to introduce the rest of the esteemed panel here. To my far right 
is the Honorable James E. Massey. Judge Massey graduated from Emory here 
in 1965 for undergrad, went to Columbia Law School in 1968, practiced law 
for about 25 years, and then became a judge in 1993. He tried to retire a few 
years ago and was asked to come back. He was recalled and is still sitting on 
the bench here in Atlanta, so I know a number of you are probably familiar 
with Judge Massey. 
We also have on the panel, to my immediate right, Daniel Bussel. Dan is a 
member of Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern, a graduate of the University of 
Pennsylvania and Stanford Law School. He clerked for the Honorable Sandra 
Day O’Connor and the Honorable Stephen Breyer. He is currently a professor 
at U.C.L.A. Law School teaching bankruptcy, commercial law, and contracts. 
He’s been an expert consultant and witness in numerous bankruptcy-related 
 
 * Shareholder, Buchalter Nemer. 
 ** Professor, University of California Los Angeles School of Law. 
 *** U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Georgia. 
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matters, participated in the preparation of amicus curiae briefs, and he also 
submitted briefs on behalf of the Marshall estate in the Supreme Court case in 
Stern, so he’s pretty intimately familiar with these issues, as you might 
imagine. 
I should also start—because each of us is still involved in issues and the 
impact of Stern—I need to give you a disclaimer that we’re all involved in 
these types of matters. We have partners at our firms who are involved in all 
sides of these issues, so while we’ll talk today about these issues, we are just 
talking about them for discussion purposes. Nothing of what we say is really 
for affirmation— 
MR. BUSSEL: Or should be held against us. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Or should be held against us. So we’re happy to talk 
about these issues, but particularly Judge Massey is not giving an advisory 
opinion from this panel this morning. 
The way I thought we’d organize this is to have Dan talk for a few minutes 
about Stern, its procedural history, and background. Then we’ll go through a 
discussion of some of the cases that we have in the materials. If you have those 
materials handy, it might be a little bit helpful for you because we’re going to 
go through them in the order that they’re presented in the materials. We’re not 
going to talk about all of them, but we are going to go through those, and it 
might help you to have that synopsis in front of you. Then after we finish the 
discussion of six or eight of those cases, Judge Massey will talk about some of 
the practical implications—how Stern might impact practitioners. I think some 
of the law students here have Stern as one of their moot court issues, and so we 
might have questions about that. We should have about ten minutes at the end 
to address questions. When we do those questions, I’ve been asked to have 
people who are interested in asking questions to walk up to the microphone 
and ask the questions from the microphone. So when we get to that point, 
please prepare yourself to get up and walk to those microphones. 
I also have one additional disclaimer. If you think that we’re going to solve 
this issue for you today, you are sorely mistaken. We are glad to talk about it, 
but as you’re going to find out, it’s really a mess, and it’s something that is 
going to take a long time before these issues are truly resolved. As a 
practitioner, I’m sure you have a lot of questions that we’re just not going to be 
able to answer for you, although we can give you the different sides of these 
particular issues. 
STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012  9:48 AM 
2012] STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL 311 
So with that said, Dan, why don’t you go ahead and give us the background 
about Stern? 
MR. BUSSEL: Thank you, Bo. First, I want to thank the Emory people for 
putting on this panel. It’s a great pleasure for me personally to be on the panel, 
and particularly to talk about Stern v. Marshall1 in a law school setting because 
I remember thirty years ago when the Marathon2 case came down, I was in law 
school, and the same sort of confusion, distress, and panic on the part of much 
of the bankruptcy community descended on us all. It really motivated my 
interest in bankruptcy at the very beginning because I remember how high 
profile the issues were back then. 
As Bo says, I think the takeaway lessons are that, one, for the immediate 
future, the Supreme Court clearly has created a litigation nightmare for 
everybody in the bankruptcy community, and it’s something that we’re going 
to be dealing with for at least several years—probably more than several years 
going forward. The second point is that we’re starting to get some pretty clear 
idea of how the issues are settling out at the bankruptcy court and the district 
court level, and Bo is going to talk some more about that after I finish my 
background talk. But nobody knows where the courts of appeal and ultimately 
the Supreme Court are going to come out on the host of issues that have been 
raised in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, and so 
there’s just a lot of uncertainty and speculation about how it’s all going to 
settle out. 
I guess the final point is, Stern v. Marshall illustrates how sorely we miss 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor because it’s pretty clear, based on her 
jurisprudence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that the 5-4 would’ve gone the 
other way if you substitute O’Connor for Alito. 
Okay, with that being said, let’s talk for a minute on how we got to where 
we are. You really have to go back, unfortunately, to the Bankruptcy Act of 
18983 to have any real understanding of these issues. The jurisdictional 
underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was a fundamental 
division in the statutes (statutory, not constitutional) between so-called 
summary and plenary jurisdiction, and so the basic framework was that, to the 
extent that there were proceedings dealing with the property of the estate, there 
 
 1 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 2 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 3 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
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was a kind of in rem jurisdiction that the then-bankruptcy referees had over the 
property. They could dispose of the property and deal with the property and 
deal with distribution of the property and settle claims against the property, but 
pretty much everything else that involved certainly third parties, that didn’t 
involve creditors and that couldn’t be characterized in one way or another as 
dealing with the res, with the property that was in the bankruptcy estate and 
indeed augmenting the estate was, to the extent that there was jurisdiction to do 
it, the jurisdiction was so-called plenary jurisdiction. That meant that the suit 
had to proceed before the federal district judge or even the state court, but not 
in front of the referee. 
The system struggled with this distinction between summary and plenary 
jurisdiction for eighty years. It was a very difficult issue at the margins to 
determine whether any particular proceeding would be characterized as 
summary or plenary. One of the great advances in the 1978 Code4—one of the 
crown jewels of the Code—was the complete reworking and repair of the 
jurisdictional underpinnings of the bankruptcy system—the creation of a 
freestanding bankruptcy court and the vesting of this very broad jurisdiction to 
handle all the matters before the bankruptcy judge. 
There was thought given during that reform effort about whether we need 
to worry about Article III. The decision was made not to appoint the 
bankruptcy judges as Article III judges, but rather use Congress’s inherent 
power under Article I to constitute the courts with non-Article III judges. And 
so the new jurisdictional provisions were tested in litigation all over the 
country, and in 1982 or 1983, the Supreme Court finally was faced with the 
issue in the Marathon5 case of whether or not the jurisdictional provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 were constitutional. In a stunning but 
confusing plurality decision in Marathon, the Court said no, that the vesting of 
the full breadth of the bankruptcy jurisdiction constituted a vesting of the 
judicial power of the United States in these new bankruptcy courts, and the 
judicial power of the United States under Article III of the Constitution had to 
be vested in judges nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and 
appointed for life. 
And so there was panic. The Supreme Court actually stayed its judgment in 
Marathon—it stayed it twice in order to give the system an opportunity to 
adjust. The hope was that Congress would reconstitute the jurisdictional 
 
 4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 5 Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50. 
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underpinnings of the court in a way that was consistent with the ruling in 
Marathon during the period of the stay. Congress didn’t act, and so eventually 
the stay lapsed and the judiciary moved in to kind of fill the gap by constituting 
what probably was an un-Constitutional emergency rule under the auspices of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States that created, for the first time, this 
distinction between core and non-core jurisdiction. 
Eventually, in 1984, Congress essentially adopted the emergency rule as a 
statute with some modification, but essentially codified this distinction 
between core proceedings and non-core proceedings.6 The decision that was 
made in both the emergency rule and in the BAFJA in the 1984 amendments 
was to construe Marathon very narrowly. And so the notion was, well, the 
Supreme Court has said that we cannot take an action that is based on state 
law, that is against a non-creditor of the estate, and likely has a jury trial right 
attached to it—we can’t vest that in the bankruptcy court. That kind of suit, we 
understand, has to go to the federal district court. Basically everything else that 
the bankruptcy judges do, we’re going to characterize as a core proceeding. 
And so they have this long enumeration that people are, I assume, generally 
familiar with in the statute of all the different kinds of matters that can arise in 
a bankruptcy case and characterizes all of those as core proceedings. 
So obviously, BAFJA was tested in the bankruptcy courts and in the district 
courts and in the courts of appeal as to whether or not it really conformed to 
Marathon, whether this very narrow reading of Marathon—that Marathon was 
really about just this one particular kind of lawsuit that couldn’t proceed in the 
bankruptcy court—was really a proper interpretation of the decision. 
The conclusion in the bankruptcy courts and the district courts and the 
courts of appeal at that time was uniformly, yes, it works. In fact, there was 
kind of a relief that we’re kind of past the Marathon issue. And people felt 
especially comfortable with that because of these two O’Connor decisions, 
Schor7 and Thomas,8 that came down in the late 1980s that seemed to back 
away. Remember, Marathon was just a plurality decision; the membership of 
the Court had changed, and Schor and Thomas indicated that the Court, or at 
least the majority of the Court, had turned into a much more pragmatic and 
functional analysis of Article III. And the analysis in those cases, albeit dealing 
 
 6 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 104(a), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 340. 
 7 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 8 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
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not with bankruptcy but dealing with administrative agencies, to the extent that 
the vesting of this additional jurisdiction in the non-Article III adjudicator 
didn’t implicate Article III values, didn’t undermine the independence of the 
federal judiciary in some material way, and had a good, practical rationale. It 
was okay, and so people kind of breathed a sigh of relief and moved on. People 
stopped testing the jurisdictional predicate of the BAFJA or the 
constitutionality of the BAFJA. People accepted the statute pretty much as it 
was written as establishing the allocation of jurisdiction between the 
bankruptcy court and the federal district court. 
There were subsequent events in the Supreme Court. There was the 
Granfinanciera9 case in the early 1990s. In Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court 
said, well, the Seventh Amendment jury trial right has to, in order to preserve 
jury trial as a viable institution, go through this exercise of analyzing whether 
any particular lawsuit is best analogized to a common law action in 1791. And 
we look at fraudulent transfer law, and fraudulent transfer law is very ancient, 
and so fraudulent transfer law looks to us like an action at law. And so the 
framers, in 1791 when they said jury trial rights shall be preserved in the 
federal system, that means they’re fraudulent transfer. They would’ve thought 
fraudulent transfer fell into that category. And so that was somewhat disturbing 
to people—that now the thought that we’d have to have jury trials, maybe even 
in Article I courts, and there was a dispute as to whether you could do it in the 
bankruptcy court or in the federal district court. And people essentially came to 
the solution that, well, to the extent that there was actually going to be a jury 
trial, if there was a jury trial right, that jury trial had to be conducted in the 
federal district court, but basically everything short of that could be done in the 
bankruptcy court. 
And it turned out that the system was pretty stable at this point because 
people really didn’t want jury trials in fraudulent transfer actions or in most of 
the other kinds of litigation that occurred regularly in the bankruptcy court. 
And so unless you had a lawsuit that was a Marathon lawsuit that was a purely 
non-core lawsuit, or you had a jury trial, the proceeding would take place 
before the bankruptcy judge, and the bankruptcy judge could finally resolve it. 
It turned out that there was very little non-core litigation, very few reports and 
recommendations, and very little withdrawal of the reference except in the 
narrow category of cases where people not only had jury trial rights but chose 
to exercise them. 
 
 9 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
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So that’s pre-Stern. So what happens in Stern v. Marshall, without going 
through the whole Bleak House explanation of what happened in Stern v. 
Marshall, which could consume easily an hour and a half just going through 
the facts to much amusement, but still, I think you’ve probably all been there 
by now. What happened is that Pierce Marshall filed a proof of claim in Anna 
Nicole Smith’s California bankruptcy based on defamatory statements that she 
had made regarding his conduct towards her (his stepmother, I guess) in 
connection with the trust that was created by her husband and his father. Anna 
Nicole counterclaimed with a tort claim asserting that she had been wronged 
by Pierce in connection with the trust. Under basic civil procedure, this is a 
compulsory counterclaim because it arises out of the same nucleus of operative 
facts, so it’s deemed a compulsory counterclaim under the Rules.10 
The bankruptcy court went ahead and disallowed the defamation claim and 
found it was without merit and gave judgment to Anna Nicole, then went on to 
adjudicate the counterclaim and gave further judgment to her for affirmative 
recovery of something like $450 million. So it comes up to the Supreme Court 
of the United States now for the second time, and the disposition of the claim 
itself is not in the case anymore—not challenged. The only issue is the 
counterclaim judgment. What the Supreme Court says is, well, we read the 
statute, and the statute is very clear that jurisdiction over counterclaims is 
vested in the bankruptcy court and we’re not going to rewrite the statute. The 
statute says this is core and that it should proceed in the bankruptcy court, but 
judgment on the counterclaim was still, even though it was characterized as a 
statutory matter as a court proceeding, an exercise of the judicial power of the 
United States, and therefore, the right to enter a final judgment on such a 
matter had to be vested in the federal district court. 
And so, unless—and the “unless” is whether it falls within one of three 
exceptions. Well, of the three exceptions, two of them are obviously not 
applicable. There’s an historical exception for territorial courts; the bankruptcy 
court is not a territorial court. That’s not going to work. There was an 
exception for courts martial, but this is not a military case. And then there was 
this sort of vague exception for matters of public right. And so the question is, 
could you fit the counterclaim into that exception as a matter of public right? 
What the Supreme Court says in Stern v. Marshall is, no, it’s not a matter 
of public right because this is a claim for affirmative recovery and it is not 
 
 10 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL GALLEYFINAL 6/8/2012  9:48 AM 
316 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
necessary to the adjudication of a claim against the estate. It does not deal with 
something that is currently the res of the bankruptcy. And we know that it’s 
not necessary to the adjudication of the claim because the claim was 
disallowed before they ever got to the counterclaim, so clearly it wasn’t 
necessary to determine whether or not the claim was valid because you’d 
already taken care of that and you could’ve moved on, and yet you went ahead 
and adjudicated this additional matter that constituted an exercise of judicial 
power. 
So why is this so disruptive? Why is this so destabilizing? And the answer 
to that, I think, is that it explodes what had been the consensus about the 
validity of the narrow interpretation of Marathon codified in the 1984 
amendments and subsequently upheld by every court in the system below the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
And so the key elements of that are, well, it’s not just about state law 
anymore—state law claims. And the reason it seems that it’s not just about 
state law anymore is because the court assimilates the Seventh Amendment 
holding in Granfinanciera to the standard for Article III judicial power and 
says, well, it’s the same test. And so in Granfinanciera, there was a jury trial 
right and it had to take place in a federal district court, and Granfinanciera 
involved a federal transfer action under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code11 which 
was a matter of federal law, not a matter of state law. 
And the second aspect of it is that it exploded this idea that, well, if it 
wasn’t an action against a creditor—that was an essential part of what the 
problem was in Marathon because in Stern v. Marshall, Marshall was a 
creditor. He filed a claim. And so to say that, well, Marathon is just about state 
law and just about actions against non-creditors isn’t really viable after Stern v. 
Marshall. So we find out now thirty years later that BAFJA just doesn’t work. 
The purported allocation of jurisdiction between federal district court and 
bankruptcy court is not consistent with the Constitution. And so the definition 
of core sweeps in things that are matters that are not of public right and 
therefore not within the authority of the bankruptcy court. 
So what is within the authority of the bankruptcy court now in the wake of 
Stern v. Marshall? That’s the million dollar question. There are really two 
competing views out there that are polar opposites, and then there’s a lot of 
attempt to strive toward some sort of middle ground. So what are the polar 
 
 11 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). 
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views? The most intellectually coherent view is the view expressed by Justice 
Scalia in his concurrence. Justice Scalia says, look, the matter of public right 
exception is rooted in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,12 back from the 19th century. 
And what it was, was a logical deduction from the sovereign immunity of the 
United States. And so the notion was that, if the government authorizes a suit 
against itself, it is waiving sovereign immunity. Since it could choose not to be 
sued at all, it can elect which forum the suit will proceed in, and it can assign 
the matter to a non-Article III forum because it was privileged to say there 
shouldn’t be any litigation of this nature at all against the United States. 
When you’re talking about “of public right,” what that means to Justice 
Scalia is, it involves the government. And so if that’s the definition of what is 
“of public right,” and if the only exceptions are territorial courts, courts 
martial, and “of public right,” then almost nothing that goes on in bankruptcy 
is of public right. Maybe, he says, maybe because of the long history here, I’d 
be willing to look the other way on processing claims against the estate. And 
beyond that, it’s all about adjudicating private rights among private parties, and 
so it’s all exercises of judicial power, and it all has to be vested in an Article III 
court. There’s no applicable exception. 
It’s theoretically coherent. It is extremely impractical as a view. It’s really 
calling for essentially an abolition of the decision to vest broad jurisdiction in 
the bankruptcy courts and allow bankruptcy judges to handle the cases. 
The other view that’s out there is the view probably espoused by the other 
people on this panel, which we’ll characterize as the bankruptcy lawyers’ view. 
The bankruptcy lawyers’ view is that a matter of public right is everything 
that’s in the Bankruptcy Code and everything that is related to a bankruptcy 
case except those things which the Supreme Court has specifically told us are 
not matters of public right. So they’ve told us in Marathon that if you have a 
state law action against a non-creditor, that’s a non-core action. That’s a matter 
of private right. Well, we’ll say that that’s outside the bankruptcy judge’s 
jurisdiction. 
Now we’ve heard in Stern v. Marshall that, as to counterclaims and 
counterclaims only, if there’s a counterclaim that calls for affirmative recovery 
that is not necessary to the adjudication, then as to that kind of an action, it’s 
report and recommendation, and it has to go to a district judge. Maybe because 
of the discussion of Granfinanciera, maybe we would be willing to concede, 
 
 12 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
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although I’m not really sure that the bar is completely there yet, but we’d be 
willing to concede that a fraudulent transfer action is outside the core 
jurisdiction, at least if it’s against a non-creditor. Because remember, 
Granfinanciera is a non-creditor. There was no proof of claim filed by the 
defendant in Granfinanciera. Everything else is okay for the bankruptcy court 
to determine. And again, Bo will talk about the cases in more detail, but 
essentially that’s where the current cases are coming out. The bankruptcy 
courts and the district courts have basically concluded that we’re going to read 
Stern v. Marshall as narrowly as possible. 
And so then the million dollar question is, what will the courts of appeal 
say? The virtue of the bankruptcy lawyers’ view is that it’s very practical. It’s 
extremely practical. It is theoretically incoherent. There’s no logic that drives 
you to the conclusion that the Stern v. Marshall cause of action is outside the 
constitutional core jurisdiction, but everything else is in. There’s no 
explanation as to why that should be so, other than the Supreme Court has said 
it is so. 
And so the question is, is there an intellectually coherent way, without 
going all the way to the Scalia position of saying nothing except matters that 
actually involve the government are public right, that allows you to draw a line 
that puts Stern v. Marshall on one side and most of the things that we really 
care about that the bankruptcy system does on a daily basis on the right side of 
the line? And so this is going to be the project of the courts of appeal, whether 
they’re going to be able to draw that line or whether they’re going to fold into 
one of the two existing positions. I don’t think the Scalia view is ultimately 
going to prevail because it’s so impractical that I just don’t think it’s going to 
go there. But if there is a middle way that emerges, I think it’s very hard on an 
intellectual basis to adopt this very, very narrow interpretation of Stern v. 
Marshall. 
And so what are the possibilities here? Well, one possibility is to come up 
with a kind of functional view that ties Article III values in some way to a 
division of jurisdiction that leaves Stern v. Marshall on one side and most 
things on the other side. And nobody has really successfully come up with a 
theory. There doesn’t seem to be a theory out there that ties independence of 
the federal judiciary and separation of powers values to that division of 
responsibility. Because after all, what is the separation of powers value that’s 
implicated by allowing a tort claim to be adjudicated by a non-Article III 
adjudicator? Most tort claims in our system are adjudicated by non-Article III 
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adjudicators. They’re determined by state judges who don’t have Article III 
protection. They’re determined by juries. They’re determined by arbitrators. So 
it’s hard to see what’s so important to separation of powers that would say, 
“Oh, yes, that’s got to be on that side of the line, everything else on the other 
side of the line.” So it seems to be a broader principle. 
So the other possibility that’s put forward for drawing a line in a 
meaningful way is to look back to tradition and say, well, we don’t have an 
intellectual line, but we have 100 years of practice. And what that essentially 
means is going back. And it’s the reason I started with the 1898 Act and 
summary versus plenary jurisdiction, going back to what was the division of 
authority between the referees in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act and the 
district court judges. 
So it seems that the Supreme Court is comfortable with that. And the 
reason it seems they’re comfortable with that is they rely, in Stern v. Marshall, 
on Katchen v. Landy,13 which is one of the great cases dealing with this 
summary/plenary  division. Nobody really understood exactly how Katchen v. 
Landy was applied. It was a confusing mess. But anyway, that was the 
landmark case. And the court says, we’re not touching Katchen v. Landy. And 
so the suggestion is made that where the line really is, going forward, is dust 
off your 14th Edition of Collier’s,14 look at the jurisdictional provisions under 
the 1898 Act, read the old cases and figure out whether your action would’ve 
been summary or plenary under the old system. And if it was summary under 
the old system, you’re okay. And if it was plenary under the old system, you 
have a problem. It may no longer be within the authority of the bankruptcy 
judge to finally determine the matter. 
I see I’ve burned a lot of time. Why don’t I let you go? 
MR. BOLLINGER: Thank you, Dan. Thank you for that eloquent 
explanation. Now let’s see how all of that works in practice. I also want to 
refer again to the materials. The materials start at page forty-three. What we’ve 
done with those materials is we have categorized the types of cases by matter, 
so that if you in practice have a particular type of issue, you can see if there are 
cases that have come down on those issues. 
 
 13 Katchen v. Landy, 328 U.S. 323 (1966). 
 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1978). 
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I also want to sort of give you a little bit of a timeline because some of 
these cases were decided at different points in that timeline. Stern was decided 
June 23rd of 2011. So we’re about eight months out from Stern. So as we go 
through each of these cases that I’m going to focus on, I’ll talk about where 
they are in that timeline and how if that impacted the analysis at all. 
The first case that we’re going to talk about is the one under chapter 11 
plan confirmation issues. That’s In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa.15 It’s a 
Middle District of Florida case, August 30th, 2011, so we’re talking about ten 
weeks after Stern. In this case, it concerns plan confirmation and some of the 
elements of a plan. There was a two-day evidentiary hearing on plan 
confirmation. The court approved the plan but did not approve the release of 
non-debtor guarantors. Instead, he put in place a lock-up provision, a four-year 
stay on actions of the guarantee, but the guarantors couldn’t transfer assets 
during that time period. So the question was whether or not this lock-up 
provision, this element of the plan, was within the court’s jurisdiction under 
Stern. The court goes through a long, detailed analysis. This is the one that 
goes through Stern on almost a point-by-point basis, and determined that 
ultimately Stern should be interpreted narrowly and that the lock-up provision 
was an integral part of the plan and thus falls within core jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L).16 The court also described the concept of consent and 
ended up concluding that, because these guarantors had the controlling interest 
in the plan proponent, they in fact had consented to the jurisdiction of the 
court. 
So, Judge Massey or Dan, any thoughts about this case and how this sort of 
fits in the broad spectrum of Stern? 
MR. BUSSEL: Well, we haven’t really talked about consent, but the consent 
ruling has to be right in this case because what happens in this case is you had 
people who are promoting a plan of reorganization, and they put it forward, 
and they want the bankruptcy judge to approve it. And when the bankruptcy 
judge does something that they don’t like in respect of the confirmation of the 
plan, all of a sudden they say, oh, Stern v. Marshall. You don’t have the 
authority to do it anymore. And I think that under any kind of rational view of 
the way the system has to operate, that can’t work. If a plaintiff or a plan 
proponent is seeking affirmative relief, it may be for the defendant or an 
opposing party to raise Stern v. Marshall, but I don’t see how they can come in 
 
 15 In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 16 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) (2006). 
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and say, after they find out that it’s not going their way, that the bankruptcy 
court doesn’t have authority. So in that sense, I think the case was kind of 
over-determined. 
If you take away the consent issue, the underlying Stern v. Marshall issue 
is a very interesting issue because now the question is, okay, this is not a 
counterclaim. This is not under (C); this is under (L). So does Stern v. 
Marshall have any application to (L)? Well, the bankruptcy lawyers will say, 
“No, (L) was a different letter than (C).”17 But there’s no explanation as to 
why. It’s just it’s a different letter. And so that’s sort of my quick take on it. 
Did you have a view, Judge Massey? 
JUDGE MASSEY: Well, I’ll talk a little bit more in a minute if I’ve got some 
time about consent, but I think there’s some reason to be concerned about how 
you determine whether consent is given. If you’re interested in making sure 
that you get a final judgment in the bankruptcy court, the best way to do that is 
to get the other side to explicitly—in writing—say that they have consented to 
the bankruptcy judge making the determination. It wouldn’t be enough to say, 
“I consent to the bankruptcy judge’s jurisdiction.” I think Stern v. Marshall 
makes it clear that the court is looking at subject matter jurisdiction differently 
than allocating the job of making the final judgment between the district judge 
and the bankruptcy judge. 
MR. BUSSEL: How do you provoke the other side to consent to the 
jurisdiction? 
JUDGE MASSEY: You’re going to have to talk them into it. Maybe you 
provoke them into it by proposing a settlement that they can’t refuse, such that 
you don’t even need to get there. Maybe you have the ability to delay the thing 
long enough so that it really hurts the other side and so you say, “Okay, you 
won’t consent. I’m going to see to it that we stay in this court as long as we can 
and then stay in the district court as long as we can. You may get your 
judgment, but it will be ten years from now.” 
MR. BOLLINGER: We have at least one other case here that talks about the 
issue of consent, and the concept, almost, of forum shopping—that Stern 
shouldn’t permit you to go with the bankruptcy judge as long as you like the 
rulings, but as soon as you don’t, you raise the Stern flag and say, well, I want 
 
 17 See id. § 157(b)(C), (L). 
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a new judge. So that seemed to be the case in that case, also in the Bayonne 
Medical Center18 case that we’ll talk about. 
Let’s talk for a second first about non-dischargeability, and the Ford Motor 
Credit Co. v. Franceschini case.19 That’s a bankruptcy case out of Texas in 
2012, this year, and this was a situation where the owner of some car 
dealerships transferred about $1.6 million to family members, despite those 
assets being encumbered by Ford Motor Credit’s liens. The court held that 
those transfers were non-dischargeable because they were done willfully and 
maliciously. The court concluded that the right to discharge is established by 
the Bankruptcy Code and is central to the public bankruptcy scheme, and 
bankruptcy courts have the authority to make such decisions pursuant to their 
in rem jurisdiction. So that is the concept of non-dischargeability. But what 
about actually determining the amount of the non-dischargeable claim? Judge 
Massey, I know you— 
JUDGE MASSEY: That’s the problem. That’s the Stern problem with regard 
to § 523 claims.20 The creditor may not agree to that. They may think that 
they’ve got a better shot in state court in front of the jury in getting a big 
judgment. And quite often you see cases filed where there’s litigation that is 
based on alleged fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, or 
some sort of willful and malicious injury. If you get into that, for example, in 
the context of defamation, figuring out exactly what the damages are is not an 
easy thing, and it’s usually something that’s decided by a jury. So one of the 
concepts that I would urge you to think about in analyzing whether a core issue 
might really be a non-core issue—and this is not the only thing—but is this the 
sort of thing that normally would get decided somewhere else, and it doesn’t 
really matter too much to creditors or to the estate what the amount is. If you 
looked at it that way, you might conclude that, if there’s dispute over the 
amount, it would have to be tried elsewhere. 
MR. BUSSEL: For the historians among you, under the 1898 Act, the non-
dischargeability action was a matter of summary jurisdiction, but the 
determination of the amount was plenary suit. So that feeds right into this 
 
 18 Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omni Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 (MS), 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 4748 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011). 
 19 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Franceschini (In re Franceschini), No. 10-30550, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 156 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2012). 
 20 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (listing debts that are exempt from discharge). 
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argument that Stern v. Marshall essentially constitutionalizes the division of 
jurisdiction that existed before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. 
JUDGE MASSEY: Let me tell you one quick idea about this, just as a 
practice concept. Let’s say that the parties have tried the case to the jury in the 
state court—no interrogatories to the jury. There were two claims. One was 
contract and one was tort. The defendant files bankruptcy, and the claim is that 
the tort claim is a fraudulent claim—the defendant committed fraud. So they 
would want you to rule that the debt is non-dischargeable because there’s an 
issue of preclusion, of claim preclusion, of collateral estoppel. The defendant 
cannot come back and re-try it the second time. The judge could certainly try 
the question of: if you had to start all over again and determine whether or not 
the fraud claim was such that the debt for fraud would be non-dischargeable. 
That doesn’t determine the amount of the claim. Now what do you do? You’ve 
got to go back in state court and have another trial all over again to determine 
how much of the judgment was for contract damages and how much of it was 
for fraud damages. It’s a mess. 
MR. BUSSEL: If that’s what the Constitution requires. 
MR. BOLLINGER: It’s a mess. That’s the circumstance that we’re in. I think 
we’ll switch over to the fraudulent transfer claims that Dan talked about. We 
only have two cases listed in these materials that have gotten to the court of 
appeals level. One of them is the Executive Benefits Insurance Co. v. Arkison 
case,21 Ninth Circuit, November 4th of 2011. All this is, is the statement that 
the appellate court has taken this and they asked for arguments to address the 
following questions: does Stern v. Marshall prohibit bankruptcy courts from 
entering final binding judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action? And if so, 
may the court hear the proceeding and submit a report and recommendation to 
the district court in lieu of entering a final judgment? Dan, any thoughts about 
why it is they’d ask for briefing, and any predictions on how you think this 
might go? 
MR. BUSSEL: Well, Judge Kosinski is on the panel. He’s the chief judge on 
the Ninth Circuit. Judge Kosinski has a deep and abiding interest in bankruptcy 
matters generally. I’d be very surprised if he wasn’t thinking very hard about 
finding that the fraudulent transfer actions were outside the jurisdiction. There 
were a number of amicus submitted in response to this public call for 
 
 21 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 661 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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briefing—actually one by one of the people that worked with me on Stern v. 
Marshall. And so they’ve gotten the briefs now, and it’s in front of the Ninth 
Circuit. My guess is that there will be a decision relatively soon. His chambers 
works pretty quickly, so I anticipate within a short period of time there will be 
a Ninth Circuit holding. If I had to bet on it, I would say that probably it’s 
going to be that fraudulent transfer actions are not within the core jurisdiction, 
or the constitutional core, whatever you want to call it. 
MR. BOLLINGER: It would just be nice to have some ruling of some kind 
for us to be able to follow. Maybe we’re getting there eventually. 
MR. BUSSEL: That may not be the one that most people want. 
MR. BOLLINGER: The issue of judicial efficiency really comes up in the 
Adelphia Recovery Trust case,22 decided on January 30th of 2012. In that 
situation, there were seven years of litigation over a fraudulent transfer claim, 
and then Stern came up and the question was, could this judge enter a final 
judgment? And the court, citing Granfinanciera, said, it’s a private right. Stern 
clearly implied that the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter 
final judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claims entered here. And then it 
goes through an analysis, ultimately determining that withdrawing the 
reference—he determined that he could enter proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the manner authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)23 
because withdrawing the reference due to uncertainty caused by Stern is a 
drastic remedy that will hamper judicial efficiency. Having to redo seven years 
worth of trial—when the bankruptcy judge has all of the history of these 
cases—just doesn’t seem to make sense as a matter of judicial economy. Any 
thoughts about that? 
JUDGE MASSEY: If it’s unconstitutional, it’s unconstitutional. You can’t 
just wink at it if you want to have a Constitution that means anything. Part of 
the problem is that figuring out what the Constitution means is not all that 
easy, and what the methodology is for interpreting it is not all that easy. I think 
what we’ve seen over the last few years with regard to the majority on the 
Court is that the concept that you can look at a statute like the Bankruptcy 
Code and analyze any constitutional problems based on some sort of pragmatic 
approach, it seems at this point to be out. What’s odd to me is that when you 
 
 22 Adelphia Recovery Trust v. FLP Group, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6847 (PAC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10804 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012). 
 23 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2006). 
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go back to the Marathon case, there were three justices in dissent: Chief 
Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Powell. They were probably the 
three most conservative, or certainly among the most conservative members of 
the Court, and they were willing to uphold the statute when bankruptcy judges 
were to be appointed by the President, and anything that even smelled like 
bankruptcy could come in front of a bankruptcy judge. 
MR. BUSSEL: Totally flipped. In Marathon, the principal author of the 
opinion was Justice Brennan, the most liberal justice we’ve had in two 
generations. 
JUDGE MASSEY: So now we’re back. It’s the other way around. It’s just 
odd. 
MR. BUSSEL: It’s funny, the ideological— 
JUDGE MASSEY: It’s just hard to figure out. 
MR. BUSSEL: Doesn’t consent go a ways here, though? These people have 
litigated for seven years on the assumption that the bankruptcy judge is going 
to render a final judgment. At some point, isn’t there some implicit waiver 
here, based on conduct? 
MR. BOLLINGER: You would think that there would be, but if you look at 
the Bayonne Medical Center case,24 which is the next one, it’s the same 
situation. Here, the plaintiff brought the action in the bankruptcy court, saw 
that things weren’t going their way, and they all of a sudden raised Stern and 
said, “I don’t want the bankruptcy judge to deal with this.” And so the court 
said, “There’s consent here. How can you just do this blatant forum shopping? 
There’s consent here.” But then he started to think about whether or not 
consent was effective, and he basically punted on the issue. He said, “What 
I’m going to do is, I’m going to conclude that there is jurisdiction, but if it is 
ultimately determined that there was no jurisdiction, then this order can be 
considered findings of fact and conclusions of law that then can be approved 
under § 157(a)(1).” What about this concept of just sort of pushing the issue to 
the next level? Does that make sense? Does that help anybody? 
 
 24 Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omni Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 (MS), 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 4748 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011). 
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JUDGE MASSEY: The question, though, is what the court is going to do with 
it when it gets there, particularly if you’ve got a lot of money involved and you 
want it to stick. 
Since we’re running out of time, I’m going to move ahead with one little 
thing that I was going to talk about, which is a 2003 Supreme Court case called 
Roell v. Withrow.25 In that case, a full-time magistrate judge, under a statute 
that permitted magistrate judges to try cases, was assigned a civil rights case 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by three prisoners against the prison staff for 
allegedly not taking care of their medical needs in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. During the preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge told one of 
them that the district judge could preside over the case and that person agreed, 
and then later in writing confirmed that. Without waiting for any other 
decision, the district judge referred the whole thing to the magistrate judge for 
the final disposition. The referral order, which I presume the plaintiffs got, said 
that it would be vacated if nobody consented. One of the three gave a written 
consent and the other two didn’t say anything. 
The case went all the way to the jury, and I don’t remember who won, but 
there was an appeal and, because the thing was treated as if a district judge had 
rendered the appeal, it went to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit said, “Was 
there consent?” They sent it back down to answer that. The magistrate judge 
said, “Well, there was no express consent, and I think there needed to be 
express consent, so I just wasted my time trying that case.” And the district 
court adopted that report and recommendation; it went up to the circuit and the 
circuit affirmed. It was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court 
reversed, 5–4. They said there was consent, and it’s got kind of this 
participation idea, and that there had to be some practical understanding of all 
of this. 
And here’s the wrinkle. The wrinkle is that among the four were Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy. Stephens was also one of the dissenters. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was in the majority, as was Justice Souter, and of course they’re off 
now. So if it’s going to be perceived as—if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito were to throw in with the other three—then anything short of a written 
consent ahead of time wouldn’t work. Dan and I have talked about this, and I 
tend to agree with Dan. I think that the Chief Justice is going to be a little more 
 
 25 Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003). 
STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012  9:48 AM 
2012] STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL 327 
pragmatic, perhaps, on this issue. But it just goes to show how hard it is to 
figure out what you have to do. 
MR. BUSSEL: The other issue you have is, does consent even work?  
Because after all, we’re in a law school, where you learn that you can’t create 
federal jurisdiction by consent. That’s a fundamental principle of federal 
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties. It 
can only be conferred by the statute. 
MR. BOLLINGER: It can be raised any time. 
MR. BUSSEL: And it can be raised any time. You can’t waive it. You can 
raise it on appeal, even though you didn’t raise it below. And so the question 
is, is there a viable consent doctrine? If you go that far and you say, even 
consent doesn’t work, you’ve really ripped a big hole in the fabric of the 
system. Because to lie in the weeds and take an adverse judgment and not raise 
the issue and then raise it on appeal, and be able to press it on appeal, is 
extremely disruptive. 
JUDGE MASSEY: I’ll tell you that Congress has been very generous with the 
judiciary over the years, but every year for the last six, seven, eight years, the 
Judicial Conference has gone to great lengths to try to save money in lots of 
different ways. The Conference is very concerned about the possibility of 
major cuts to the budget. That’s not going to affect the salaries of Article III 
judges, but it could affect how long it takes to get a case through the federal 
system. If consent were not possible, then I don’t see how you could avoid 
having another 1,500 or so Article III judges, and the Article III judges don’t 
particularly want that and neither does Congress, so hopefully the Court will 
take that practical advice to mind. 
MR. BUSSEL: Well, we promised them an opportunity to ask questions. 
We’re kind of running late. Do you want to throw it open to the floor? 
MR. BOLLINGER: Judge Massey, do you have any other practical tips you 
want to bring up quickly before we go to questions? 
JUDGE MASSEY: One thing that I would point out is when you start 
analyzing the core, the items that are in the part of 28 U.S.C. § 157 that lists 
core proceedings, think about issues like who else is affected—who besides 
debtors and creditors are affected, and does the matter that’s to be adjudicated 
have the distinct odor of a matter that could’ve been tried in front of a jury in 
1791. 
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I’ll just throw out a couple of ideas. Section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy 
Code26 permits the sale of non-debtor property. As far as the debtor is 
concerned, the property is property of the estate. It’s right there. There’s no 
dispute about it. Does the bankruptcy judge have the authority to order the sale 
of other people who just happen to have the bad luck of owning a piece of 
property with the debtor? Think about the effect that might have on them. Or 
on the turnover of property of the estate—that seems pretty straightforward. 
Well, what if the property of the estate is not in the possession of the debtor at 
the time of the filing and there’s a dispute about whether it’s property of the 
estate? Or suppose the property of the estate is a tax refund and the debtor in 
the chapter 7 case wasn’t advised properly or ignored the advice of the attorney 
or just didn’t know and spends the tax refund postpetition? It’s received 
postpetition, spent postpetition, property of the estate. Now the trustee wants a 
turnover of the property of the estate. It doesn’t exist anymore. I personally 
have questioned whether you can do that by motion, but maybe you could 
since the debtor is involved. But it sounds like conversion, doesn’t it? It sounds 
like conversion. 
Or what about avoiding liens against real property under § 544, or any kind 
of property under § 544?27 Some of those kinds of claims that get made there 
could easily have been made in state court. It’s not easy to figure out what the 
answer to all of this is. One way that some judges have tried to finesse this is to 
put in an opinion saying, I think I’ve got jurisdiction. That’s kind of the 
bankruptcy practitioner/judge point of view that the Chief Justice says is not 
going to make a big ripple. This is just about this one case. There’s one in 
particular out of the Southern District that I read where the bankruptcy judge 
said, I’m going to render a judgment on this fraudulent transfer claim, but if I 
didn’t really have the authority to do so, please accept these findings of fact 
and conclusions of law as proposals. But a lot of the district courts now are 
saying flat-out that fraudulent transfer claims are matters that have to come 
before an Article III judge unless there’s consent. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Well, you have now witnessed the difficulty of 
squeezing a five-hour topic into about an hour. Jeremy, should we take a few 
minutes for questions or would you rather stay on schedule? We’re happy to do 
either. One question. Anybody have a real urgent question? 
MR. BUSSEL: Is it your question? 
 
 26 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2006). 
 27 See id. § 544. 
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MR. BOLLINGER: If you have a question, go ahead and go to the 
microphone. 
JUDGE MASSEY: No judges please. 
MR. BUSSEL: That’s what we need is judges. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: . . . statutory authority to estimate claims, 
presumably over the opposition of the creditor who doesn’t want his claim 
estimated. There’s a huge body of law about the bankruptcy court needing to 
be efficient and orderly and get the administration done, and not holding it up 
for a long period of time, which Stern v. Marshall is doing. So, is a possible 
statutory solution to give all the other chapter folks the same estimation power 
as in chapter 11, to benefit the economy in getting the estate resolved? And it 
just works in bankruptcy court, and if you want to go litigate it in state court, 
feel free, but for purposes of this estate, we’re going to estimate the claim. 
What do you think? 
MR. BOLLINGER: Dan or Judge Massey? 
MR. BUSSEL: I think that you can do better than that. With respect to claims 
against the estate, I just can’t believe that that’s not still within the core 
jurisdiction. I think you can allow or disallow the claim, and it’s a final 
judgment. If you’re suggesting that you can estimate the counterclaim, I don’t 
think that’s going to be a binding judgment. I think that you’re going to run 
headlong into Stern v. Marshall if you’re talking about a claim out, a 
counterclaim against the creditor. If you’re talking about a claim in, a claim 
against the estate, I think the bankruptcy judge can continue to do what they’ve 
always done, which is by final order allow or disallow the claim. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Judge Massey wanted to bring up a particular case on 
whether or not claims were a slam dunk. 
JUDGE MASSEY: I’ll let the case speak for itself as the counterargument. 
MR. BUSSEL: That case is wrong, by the way. 
JUDGE MASSEY: It’s the case of In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club 
Association, Inc. decided last July.28 In that case, there was a dispute between a 
limited partnership and an association of homeowners. The association 
 
 28 Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n (In re Colony Beach & 
Tennis Club Ass’n), 456 B.R. 545 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL GALLEYFINAL 6/8/2012  9:48 AM 
330 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
members—the homeowners—were members of the association by virtue of 
buying the homes and they became limited partners, so they were part of both 
entities. The dispute was over who had the responsibility of maintaining 
certain common areas. Was it the partnership which had a hotel, which was 
generating some revenue? Or was it homeowners, which would have to be 
done by assessment? And so the dispute ended up in state court. The 
partnership sued the association. The association filed bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy judge ruled for the debtor. Steve Merryday was the district judge. 
You’ve got to read it. He was not particularly happy with how the bankruptcy 
judge handled the factual analysis. He determined that the allowance of that 
claim was strictly a matter of how you interpret the contract involving the 
association under state law. Congress may have said it was a core matter, but it 
required an Article III judge to determine the amount of that claim. The 
problem with that, of course, is every claim just about arises under state law. 
And that is the ultimate nightmare. 
MR. BOLLINGER: I have one more person sitting at— 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just have two follow-up comments to keep in mind 
in all this discussion. One, Article III does not require presidential 
appointment. It does not require confirmation by the Senate to be an Article III 
judge. You look confused. Look at Article II that gives Congress the right to 
vest the appointment of inferior officers in, among other things, courts of law, 
just like the current system. 
The second comment, just to keep in mind theoretically, Stern v. Marshall is 
not about jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because bankruptcy courts do not 
have any jurisdiction. All of the jurisdiction is in the district court. Stern v. 
Marshall is about how much authority the bankruptcy judge has to determine 
these matters. 
MR. BUSSEL: I think the second point is an important point. That’s really the 
answer to the you-can’t-consent argument, is to make a distinction between the 
subject matter jurisdiction which is vested in the federal district court, but the 
right of the allocation of authority between bankruptcy court and federal 
district court—that’s not subject matter jurisdiction. That’s a kind of lesser 
jurisdiction and consent can cure a defect there. 
JUDGE MASSEY: And that’s why you want to be sure if you get consent that 
it doesn’t just say, “We agree, the bankruptcy judge has jurisdiction.” 
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MR. BUSSEL: That’s critical. On the Article III point, I think that the 
problem is that you can’t assign the judicial power of the United States to an 
inferior officer. You have to assign it to a judge that’s appointed consistent 
with the restrictions of Article III. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Okay. Thank you very much. I apologize for going over, 
but thank you very much for your time. 
 
